Money,
Credit and the Federal
Reserve Banking System
Conquer
the Crash, Chapter 10
By Robert Prechter
How the Federal Reserve Has
Encouraged the Growth of Credit
Congress authorized the Fed not only to
create money for the government but also to “smooth out” the economy by
manipulating credit
(which also happens to be a re-election tool for
incumbents). Politics being what they are, this manipulation has been
almost exclusively in the direction of making credit easy to obtain.
The Fed used to make more credit available to the banking system by
monetizing federal debt,
that is, by creating money. Under the
structure of our "fractional reserve" system, banks were authorized to
employ that new money as "reserves" against which they could make new
loans. Thus, new money meant new credit.
It meant a lot of new credit because banks
were allowed by regulation to lend out 90 percent of their deposits,
which meant that banks had to keep 10 percent of deposits on hand ("in
reserve") to cover withdrawals. When the Fed increased a bank's
reserves, that bank could lend 90 percent of those new
dollars. Those
dollars,
in turn, would make their way to other banks as new deposits.
Those other banks could lend 90 percent of those deposits, and so on.
The expansion of reserves and deposits throughout the banking system
this way is called the "multiplier effect." This process expanded the
supply of credit well beyond the supply of money.
Because of competition from money market
funds, banks began using fancy financial manipulation to get around
reserve requirements. In the early 1990s, the Federal Reserve Board
under Chairman Alan Greenspan took a controversial step and removed
banks' reserve requirements almost entirely. To do so, it first lowered
to zero the reserve requirement on all accounts other than checking
accounts. Then it let banks pretend that they have almost no checking
account balances by allowing them to "sweep" those deposits into
various savings accounts and money
market funds at the end of each
business day. Magically, when monitors check the banks' balances at
night, they find the value of checking accounts artificially
understated by hundreds of billions of dollars. The net result is that
banks today conveniently meet their nominally required reserves
(currently about $45b.) with the cash in their vaults that they need to
hold for everyday transactions anyway. [1st edition of Prechter's Conquer
the Crash was
published in 2002 -- Ed.]
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By this change in regulation, the Fed
essentially removed itself from the businesses of requiring banks to
hold reserves and of manipulating the level of those reserves. This
move took place during a recession and while S&P earnings
per
share were undergoing their biggest drop since the 1940s. The temporary
cure for that economic contraction was the ultimate in "easy money."
We still have a fractional reserve system
on the books, but we do not have one in actuality. Now banks can lend
out virtually all of their deposits. In fact, they can lend out more
than all of their deposits, because banks' parent companies can issue
stock, bonds, commercial paper or any financial instrument and lend the
proceeds to their subsidiary banks, upon which assets the banks can
make new loans. In other words, to a limited degree, banks can arrange
to create their own new money for lending purposes.
Today, U.S.
banks have extended 25 percent
more total credit than they have in total deposits ($5.4 trillion vs.
$4.3 trillion). Since all banks do not engage in this practice, others
must be quite aggressive at it. For more on this theme, see Chapter 19
[of Conquer
the Crash].
Recall that when banks lend money, it gets
deposited in other banks, which can lend it out again. Without a
reserve requirement, the multiplier effect is no longer restricted to
ten times deposits; it is virtually unlimited. Every new dollar
deposited can be lent over and over throughout the system: A deposit
becomes a loan becomes a deposit becomes a loan, and so on.
As you can see, the fiat money system
has
encouraged inflation via both money creation and the expansion of
credit. This dual growth has been the monetary engine of the historic
uptrend of stock prices in wave (V) from 1932. The stupendous growth in
bank credit since 1975 (see graphs in Chapter 11) has provided the
monetary fuel for its final advance, wave V. The effective elimination
of reserve
requirements a decade ago extended that trend to one of
historic proportion.
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The Net Effect of Monetization
Although the Fed has almost wholly
withdrawn from the role of holding book-entry reserves for banks, it
has not retired its holdings of Treasury
bonds. Because the Fed is
legally bound to back its notes (greenback currency) with government
securities, today almost all of the Fed's
Treasury bond assets are held
as reserves against a nearly equal dollar value of Federal Reserve
notes in circulation around the world. Thus, the net result of the
Fed's 89 years of money inflating is that the Fed has turned $600
billion worth of U.S. Treasury and foreign obligations into Federal
Reserve notes.
Today the Fed's production of currency is
passive, in response to orders from domestic and foreign banks, which
in turn respond to demand from the public. Under current policy, banks
must pay for that currency with any remaining reserve balances. If they
don't have any, they borrow to cover the cost and pay back that loan as
they collect interest on their own loans. Thus, as things stand, the
Fed no longer considers itself in the business of "printing money" for
the government. Rather, it facilitates the expansion of credit to
satisfy the lending policies of government and banks.
If banks
and the Treasury
were to become
strapped for cash in a monetary crisis, policies could change. The
unencumbered production of banknotes could become deliberate Fed or
government policy, as we have seen happen in other
countries throughout
history. At this point, there is no indication that the Fed has
entertained any such policy. Nevertheless, Chapters 13 and 22 address
this possibility.